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Incentives for Early Arrival in Cooperative Games: A Summary
2025
会议录名称COMMUNICATIONS IN COMPUTER AND INFORMATION SCIENCE
ISSN1865-0929
卷号2210 CCIS
页码76-85
发表状态已发表
DOI10.1007/978-981-96-0214-8_6
摘要The present study concerns itself with the analysis of cooperative games in which players are required to join the game in a sequential manner. In such games, the value generated by those players who have joined at any given point must be irrevocably divided among the other players. Two criteria are proposed for the value division mechanism: firstly, that players should have incentives to join as early as possible, and secondly, that the division should be considered fair. In order to satisfy this requirement, it is necessary that each player’s expected share in the mechanism should be equal to her Shapley value, assuming that the players’ arrival order is uniformly random. The primary technical contribution of this study is a comprehensive characterisation of 0-1 value games for which suitable mechanisms are available. We demonstrate that the Rewarding First Critical Player (RFC) mechanism is complete, in that a 0-1 value function admits a mechanism with the aforementioned properties if and only if RFC satisfies them. Furthermore, we provide an analytical characterisation of all such value functions. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2025.
关键词Analytical characterization Cooperative game Early arrival Online mechanism Property Sequential manners Shapley value Technical contribution Value functions
会议名称1st International Workshop on Mechanism Design in Social Networks, MNet 2024, Held in Conjunction with IJCAI 2024
出版地152 BEACH ROAD, #21-01/04 GATEWAY EAST, SINGAPORE, 189721, SINGAPORE
会议地点Jeju, Korea, Republic of
会议日期August 4, 2024 - August 4, 2024
URL查看原文
收录类别EI ; CPCI-S
语种英语
资助项目Science and Technology Commission of Shanghai Municipality["22ZR1442200","23010503000"]
WOS研究方向Computer Science
WOS类目Computer Science, Interdisciplinary Applications
WOS记录号WOS:001445765600006
出版者Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
EI入藏号20250217644948
EISSN1865-0937
原始文献类型Conference article (CA)
文献类型会议论文
条目标识符https://kms.shanghaitech.edu.cn/handle/2MSLDSTB/483882
专题信息科学与技术学院_博士生
信息科学与技术学院_PI研究组_赵登吉组
通讯作者Zhao, Dengji
作者单位
ShanghaiTech University, Shanghai, China
第一作者单位上海科技大学
通讯作者单位上海科技大学
第一作者的第一单位上海科技大学
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Ge, Yaoxin,Zhang, Yao,Zhao, Dengji. Incentives for Early Arrival in Cooperative Games: A Summary[C]. 152 BEACH ROAD, #21-01/04 GATEWAY EAST, SINGAPORE, 189721, SINGAPORE:Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH,2025:76-85.
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