Incentives for Early Arrival in Cost Sharing
2024-10-24
状态已发表
摘要In cooperative games, we study how values created or costs incurred by a coalition are shared among the members within it, and the players may join the coalition in a online manner such as investors invest a startup. Recently, Ge et al. [10] proposed a new property called incentives for early arrival (I4EA) in such games, which says that the online allocation of values or costs should incentivize agents to join early in order to prevent mutual strategic waiting. Ideally, the allocation should also be fair, so that agents arriving in an order uniformly at random should expect to get/pay their Shapley values. Ge et al. [10] showed that not all monotone value functions admit such mechanisms in online value sharing games. In this work, we show a sharp contrast in online cost sharing games. We construct a mechanism with all the properties mentioned above, for every monotone cost function. To achieve this, we first solve 0-1 valued cost sharing games with a novel mechanism called Shapley-fair shuffle cost sharing mechanism (SFS-CS), and then extend SFS-CS to a family called generalized Shapley-fair shuffle cost sharing mechanisms (GSFS-CS). The critical technique we invented here is a mapping from one arrival order to another order so that we can directly apply marginal cost allocation on the shuffled orders to satisfy the properties. Finally, we solve general valued cost functions, by decomposing them into 0-1 valued functions in an online fashion.
关键词Cost Sharing Early Arrival Online Mechanisms
语种英语
DOIarXiv:2410.18586
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出处Arxiv
收录类别PPRN.PPRN
WOS记录号PPRN:118800761
WOS类目Computer Science, Theory& Methods
文献类型预印本
条目标识符https://kms.shanghaitech.edu.cn/handle/2MSLDSTB/452402
专题信息科学与技术学院_博士生
信息科学与技术学院_PI研究组_赵登吉组
信息科学与技术学院_硕士生
通讯作者Zhao, Dengji
作者单位
1.ShanghaiTech Univ, Key Lab Intelligent Percept & Human Machine Collaborat, Shanghai, Peoples R China
2.Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Key Lab Interdisciplinary Res Computat & Econ, Shanghai, Peoples R China
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Zhang, Junyu,Zhang, Yao,Ge, Yaoxin,et al. Incentives for Early Arrival in Cost Sharing. 2024.
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