上海科技大学知识管理系统

Diffusion auction design is a newly-popular research topic in mechanism design. Its central problem is to incentivize buyers to further promote the auction information via their own social relations. As fair reward offers a strong diffusion incentive for buyers, our goal is to design a diffusion auction with a fair reward scheme (to reward more buyers for diffusion). We introduce the cooperative game perspective into diffusion auctions as proven techniques for fairly distributing the cooperation value. On this basis, we build a \textit{cooperative model for diffusion auctions} with characteristic function defined as the highest possible social welfare achieved within the coalition; and then define property \textit{opportunity-fair (OF)} for diffusion auctions based on the Shapley value. We propose a mechanism named \textit{Shapley value-based diffusion auction (SVDA)} to mimic the Shapley value without sacrificing the incentive. SVDA is proved to be IC,IR,OF. The ratio between an arbitrary buyer's expected utility and her Shapley value lies in $[1/2,1]$. Furthermore, we give \textit{a class of mechanisms} extended from SVDA by restricting the joining orders, opening up the opportunities to explore new mechanisms with fairer rewards.